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ABSTRACT 
Animals have to process quantity of information in order to take decisions and adapt their behaviors to their physical 
and social environment. They have to remember previous events (learning), to cope with their internal (motivational 
and emotional) states and to display flexible behavioral responses. From a human point of view it is quite impossible to 
access all those information, not only because of the sensorial channels used that can vary but also because all the pro- 
cessing phase occurs in the “black box” and non-human animals are not able to express verbally what they think, feel or 
want. Though useful information might lie in the “collected data” (animal mind), extracting them into insightful knowl- 
edge with human-accessible form (clear meaning, no interpretation) presents a demanding and sophisticated undertaking. 
Several scientists decided to trained different individuals from several species (apes, dolphins, grey parrots, dogs) in 
order to teach them a new communicative system that they could share with us. Here, the different studies (techniques 
and species used) are presented, the constrains but also the main findings. 
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1. Introduction 
Humans are curious by nature and want to increase their 
knowledge about their environment. In a developmental 
and philosophical point of view they are interested in: 
“what makes human different from other species” and 
“how this human species evolved”. There is more and 
more evidence of animal sentience and consciousness 
nevertheless it is a hard job to know exactly what they 
want and how they see the world. The interspecific com- 
munication is complex and often not complete because of 
differences regarding modality and integration of the 
signals. 
Several studies have been conducted in ethology, be- 
havioral ecology, comparative psychology and cogni- 
tion in order to “ask” other species: What do you see? 
What do you want? Studies in the field, using playback 
paradigm for instance revealed complex communicative 
abilities in different species such as birds or primates [1]. 
The different developmental trajectories of vocal produc- 
tion, usage, and response create an oddly asymmetric 
system of communication in which a small repertoire of 
relatively fixed calls, (each linked to a particular context), 
can nonetheless give rise to an open-ended, highly modi- 
fiable, and cognitively rich set of meanings. Recent studies 
of baboons and eavesdropping songbirds provide exam- 
ples of species in which constrained vocal production 
and usage by signalers provides listeners with extensive 
information about their social environment [2]. Many 
studies have been conducted in the lab in order to control 
as much as possible the quality and quantity as well as 
the nature of the stimuli and to look at the animal re- 
sponse even in a complete artificial environment and 
non-relevant task. Operant conditioning has been exten- 
sively used in order to study animal behavior as well as 
language ability [3]. Then it is also possible to look at 
individual preferences when given a choice (for space, 
social partner, type of food, etc.) and also to look at their 
behavior when facing ambiguous stimuli they were not 
trained to respond at. Indeed, cognitive bias is a non- 
invasive technique to evaluate internal states and mood. 
As well as expectation violation and incentive contrast 
are paradigms that can be tested with animals but also 
with infants… which mean different species without 
language (verbal) ability. Nevertheless it is easier when it 
is possible to share thoughts, intentions, perceptions, etc. 
through direct communication. 
Because scientists still did not find the ring of King 
Salomon—the object with which the king could talk to 
the animals—they have tried different (sometimes co 
plementary and not all fruitful) strategies to teach ani- 
mals to communicate with people in a human-designed 
language. Interspecies communication is a powerful mean 
of studying animal cognition. It also a good opportunity 
to know how they perceive the world (color, contrast, 
optical illusion), what are their preferences (food, toys, 
etc.) and their thought. This system offers the possibility 
to interact directly, asking questions and also to compare 
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the results between species (included humans). Interspe- 
cies communication could also bring some answers about 
human language roots and evolution. The major con- 
straint is that the communication code has first to be 
taught, which is time consuming. 
The first species, the scientist focus on, where apes 
because of their genetic proximity. Researchers also work 
with marine mammals because of their large brain. One 
scientist decided to work with a parrot. African grey par- 
rots have good vocal mimicry ability. Because birds are 
able to reproduce exact human words, intonations and 
even laugh, people invest emotionally and attribute in- 
tentions easily. Even infants treat parrot vocal production 
as human ones [4]. Parrots have a very different vocal 
tract and different brain structures compared to humans 
nevertheless present some analogies in the vocal learning 
and production process [5]. Hand-reared individuals are 
also sensitive to human behavior [6,7] and given cues [8]. 
Despite their relative brain size, compared with mam- 
mals, psittacidae birds had larger brain that expected 
(compared to their body size) and display elaborated be- 
haviors when facing physical and social problems [9]. 
More recently, a Portuguese team decided to start the 
adventure with a dog. Different techniques have been 
created and used according the species (motor capacity 
mainly) but not only. The production of arbitrary signs 
has been documentted in several “linguistic” animals 
submitted to long-term and intensive contact with hu- 
mans. Washoe and other chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas 
and orangutans were trained in the use of American Sign 
Language [10-12]. Alex, a grey African parrot, was 
shown to produce and apply English labels, answering 
questions and making vocal requests [13,14]. In other 
cases, production skills were installed through concrete, 
external interfaces which make the production process 
easier and permit testing communication competence in 
contexts spatially and temporally distant from associated 
objects or activities. The chimpanzee Sarah placed col- 
ored plastic chips, each one standing for a word, on a 
“language board” [15]. Duane Rumbaugh developed a 
computer controlled system, the keyboard which held 
keys with different lexigrams (arbitrary visual signs) [16]. 
Lexigrams have been used with chimpanzees and bono-  
bos and more recently with a dog. Non-primate species, 
such as dolphins, have also been shown to be able to use 
levers or keys instrumentally: the bottlenose dolphin 
Akeakamai was able to report yes or no, by pressing 
paddles, in response to gestural questions about the 
presence of specific objects in her tank [17]. Working 
with these species represent many constrains regarding 
the time necessary to familiarize, socialize and trained 
the animals and also the cost of the housing and care. 
Recent research points to the existence of a complex and 
successful communication process between humans and 
dogs, which may have been selected for during domesti- 
cation [18,19]. Investigation of doghuman communica- 
tion has been largely conducted on comprehension abili- 
ties (discrimination of verbal commands and obedience 
training [20,21], word-object associations [22], human 
given cues such as pointing or gazing [23-27] and much 
less on the production side. Experimental studies show 
that dogs signal motivational state through acoustic fea- 
tures of barks [28,29] or use body orientation, gazing, 
going to and fro to direct the owner’s attention both to 
themselves and to a place of interest in the environment 
[23,24]. Barking and gazing are spontaneous, species- 
specific components of the communication repertory of 
dogs. Dogs are already living in human houses and they 
do not need to be extensively familiarized. Dogs are also 
attentive to the attentional state of humans [30,31] and 
can attribute visual perspective taking [32]. That’s why 
this species represents a good model to develop a new 
common communicative system. 
In this review, different type of techniques used to 
teach an artificial communicative system will be pre- 
sented and the species involved. In order to illustrate the 
diversity and complexity of the behaviors that the scien- 
tists observed examples of several studies would be pre- 
sented. 
2. Methods and Animals 
2.1. Apes 
2.1.1. Human Words 
The first attempts of communication were to raise apes in 
human family so that they could learn to speak. Gua 
(chimpanzee of the Kelloggs) was able to imitate motor 
actions but not human speech [33]. Viki, a chimpanzee, 
has been raised as a human child with Cathy and Keith 
Hayes in order to learn human verbal language [34]. 
Nevertheless due to anatomical configuration (Vocal 
cords are placed higher in the vocal tract compared to 
humans and the tongue is bigger), apes are not able to 
modulate the sound enough to reproduce human words. 
Viki succeed to reproduce only very few words (3 or 4). 
The natural vocalizations production is link to emotional 
state of the animal and thus hard to control and modulate 
on the contrary to intentional shared communication. 
2.1.2. Sign Language 
Scientist decided to use American Sign Language and to 
teach “words” to apes. Humans produce the sign in front 
of the apes. The animal learns through observation and 
also with hand modeling (from humans or other ape). 
The individual has to shape his hands in a specific way 
and place and/or move them appropriately for each word. 
This method, used with deaf humans seems relevant to 
communicate with another species. 
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Beatrix & Allen Gardner and then Roger Fouts teach 
Washoe, a chimpanzee, the simplified American Sign 
Language [35,36]. Other chimpanzees (Loulis) and bono- 
bos (Kanzi) learned to sign. Francine Patterson did the 
same with Koko and Michael, two gorillas (Gorilla go- 
rilla) and Lyn Miles with Chantek (Pongo borneo) [12], 
an orangutan. All those apes learned more than hundreds 
of signs [37]. 
2.1.3. Lexigrams 
Ernst von Glasersfeld developed the language that Lana 
learned to use: he coined the term “lexigram”, created the 
first 120 of them and designed the grammar that regu- 
lated their combination at Yerkes National Primate Re- 
search Center. Lana was the first chimpanzee that learned 
to use lexigrams [16]. Each symbol refers to a person, an 
object or its characteristic, an action or some general 
concept such as good, bad, yesterday, etc. 
Other chimpanzees (Panzee, Sherman) but also bono- 
bos (Panbanisha, Kanzi, Nyota) have been taught (or 
learned through observation) and tested with this method. 
Although Kanzi learned to communicate using a key- 
board with lexigrams (through observation), he also 
picked up some American Sign Language. Kanzi & Pan- 
banisha were able to imitate human words but also indi- 
cate (by pointing at their mouth and throat) their diffi- 
culty to vocalize. So able to control their vocal produc- 
tion, in the same way that they develop some dexterity to 
sign [38]. 
2.1.4. Object Combination 
Ann & David Premack used a different method to teach 
Sarah (chimpanzee) to communicate by writing with 
magnetized plastic symbol [39]. All the word referring to 
object, person, action or related to comparison for in- 
stance were associated with specific unique magnet. The 
chimpanzee could communicate with the researchers 
placing the magnet on a support. One of the advantages 
was that the individual do not have to remember the 
question or the previous answer as the information could 
be visible on the support. 
2.1.5. Other 
Ann & David Premack developed another technique in 
which the ape has to use a joystick in order to generate 
the phonemes of English. This technic was two compli- 
cated and thus stopped [37]. 
2.2. Dolphins & California Sea Lion 
Louis Herman and Ronald Schusterman used large-scale 
arm movments, signs (hand-shaped) and computer-gene- 
rated sounds with bottlenose dolphins, Puka, Kea, Ake, 
Phoenix (Tursiops truncates). The animals had to asso- 
ciate specific (artificial) whistles with objects and/or 
actions. Dolphins were asked also to use (press on) dedi- 
cated paddle [40,41]. Scientists used command gestures 
to teach Californian sea lion (Zalophus californianus), 
Bertie and Rocky, names and characteristics of objects 
[42-44]. 
2.3. African Grey Parrots 
In the 70s Irene Pepperberg started her work with Alex, 
an African grey parrot [45]. She used the Model/Rival 
technique in order to English words to the bird. In this 
method, two persons interact in front of the bird and take 
successively the role of the trainer—asking for the name 
or characteristic of an object and the student—that re- 
presents the model while answering correctly. In this 
situation, the student represents also a rival for the bird 
because he gets the trainer’ attention and receive the re- 
ward (object or food) if the label was correct-corres- 
ponding to the question. Humans exchange their role and 
sometimes ask directly to the bird for the correct answer 
[14]. The Human student also produces sometimes in- 
correct answer so that the bird can see that not all the 
sounds have the same meanings and that the trainer is 
expecting for a specific (referential) label. Several birds 
were trained by Irene Pepperberg and currently Griffin is 
still learning more words and concepts [46]. Other labo- 
ratory decided to work on language-trained parrot, in 
France [47,48], Czech Republic [48] or Canada [49]. 
Different methods have tested in which several parame- 
ters were changed such as the number or the nature of the 
trainers [50], the social interaction [51,52], the referen- 
tiallity [48], the joint attention [53], the use of video [54, 
55] or sound [48] records, etc. The results vary according 
the birds (sex, age, personality, cognitive ability, vocal 
competencies, motivation) and their social environment 
[46,48]. Most of the bird learned rapidly new words but 
some of them had difficulties to associate to an object or 
a characteristic. 
2.4. Dog 
More recently a Portuguese team starts to train a dog to 
use a keyboard in order to ask for food, a walk or to be 
petted [56]. A female mongrel dog named Sofia, was 
submitted to a training program in which she acquired 
the discrimination of lexigrams associated to specific 
desires and the use of a keyboard to produce requests. 
The authors make sure about the motivational state of the 
animal (intention) and the communicative nature of the 
interactions (perspective taking; [57]). The authors report 
that the dog learn quickly to use the device when experi- 
menter could see the information. They observed some 
modifications in the behavioral display before and after 
keyboard pressing suggesting a certain arousal for spe- 
cific needs [56]. 
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In general, all the individuals (whatever species they 
belong to) have (had) a good understanding of human 
language (English, French, Portuguese, etc.) [48,56,58]. 
3. Achievements 
Possession of (or the ability to acquire) human language 
or at least some form of a human-based communication 
code has been posited as a necessary precondition for an 
organism to organize and process information for certain 
complex cognitive tasks. Language may help to have 
abstract representation even if it’s not absolute pre-re- 
quest as human infants, for instance, could have difficul- 
ties label object but not to classify them in same/different 
categories. Language may reveal inherent abilities rather 
than enable animal to learn more complex tasks even if 
animal that have been trained to use human-based lan- 
guage code do better than untrained animals on some 
tests such as those requiring understanding of analogies, 
but not for task of spatial representation [39]. 
3.1. Animal Acquisition of Human Based 
Communicative System 
Apes signed and used plastic magnet and lexigram to ask 
for toys, food, etc., but also for walk and interactions. In 
few occasions they described their environment [59,60]. 
Alex learned and use English labels to answer the ques- 
tions but also to ask for something. Sometimes he even 
asks questions about objects characteristics or name [46]. 
Dolphins learned to mimics specific sounds, used to de- 
signed specific objects. [41]. The Sea lion was able to 
associate the different gestures with specific meaning 
such as object’ name, actions or even object characteris- 
tic [43]. Loulis (chimpanzee) learned to sign for several 
different categories such as people name, objects, actions, 
location. He also displays “No” or “Want” signs [61]. 
Apes and parrots learn different categories such as “color 
of”, “name of”, “size of”, etc. [37]. 
Sofia’s performances at the keyboard was based on the 
association of a specific sign with a specific desire and 
that it was part of goal directed sequences similar to 
those normally displayed by dogs. The dog does not use 
it when alone, presses in view of the experimenter [57] 
and alternates gazing between the experimenter and the 
object. 
The apes species, dolphins and grey parrot show evi- 
dence of both discrete combinatory and category-based 
rules. The dolphins and Kanzi show knowledge of argu- 
ment structure (although for Kanzi, only in his compre- 
hension of English). The capacities that underlie these 
three properties of syntax, then, do not appear uniquely 
human [62]. Referentiality and syntax have been also 
demonstrated with other apes. Sherman and Austin (two 
chimpanzees using lexigrams) show some understanding  
of the different category “food” vs “tool”, and classify 
the objects, their pictures or even their corresponding 
lexigrams. [37] Lana learned to chain lexigrams into 
strings that were similar to human sentences. Heidi Lyn 
showed that the vocabulary errors produced during ten- 
year data collecting period for Kanzi and Pabanisha re- 
vealed that apes are able spontaneously to create a com- 
plex, hierarchical, web of representations when exposed 
to a symbol system (lexigrams) [63]. The Californian sea 
lion show some understanding of semantic [42]. Sofia 
has been able to extract the information contained in 
complex messages and to integrate it in directed per- 
formance. In a recent study Sofia responds to verbal re- 
quests composed of two independent terms, one referring 
to an object and the other to an action to be performed 
relative to the object [64]. Nevertheless, when looking at 
word comprehension in other dogs, we can see that Rico 
(border collie) discriminate dozens of words and showed 
a “fast-mapping’’ performance similar to children’s, that 
is, the capacity of attributing, by exclusion, a new word 
to an object never seen before [22] and Chaser, another 
border collie [65], comprehends object names as verbal 
referents (more than a thousand words). Of course dogs 
never learned to say any of the words they learned (un- 
derstand). In this respect, their limited vocal production 
and extensive comprehension are similar to those of human- 
trained sea lions [42], and dolphins [66]. Apes are also 
limited regarding their vocal ability but they have a quite 
good understanding of human words and are able to map 
new words onto new object (fast mapping) in ostensive 
context like dogs [67]. Alex also displayed fast-mapping 
[68]. 
Most of the individuals (apes and parrots) have been 
observed while babbling. Some individuals also recom- 
bine phonemes or sign or even create new ones (e.g. 
Washoe created a sign for “bib”) [69,70]. These are some 
example of combination: “ring-ball” combination of bot- 
tlenose dolphins [71] while playing with both toys at the 
same time, Washoe sign “water bird” for swan or “cry 
hurt food” for radish; Lana press the lexigrams “Coke 
which is orange” for Fanta [72], Koko sign “White tiger” 
for zebra; Alex: “green nut” for pumpkin seeds, “banerry” 
for apple [46]. 
Animals have been also observed “talking” to them- 
selves [38,73]. This occurred during the learning and 
consolidation phase but not only. Indeed, parrots enjoy 
these moments (resting period). They can also “talk” to 
describe their environment or express what they have to 
do (e.g. Washoe signed “Quiet” when she sneaked into a 
forbidden room [38]. 
3.2. Individuals Understand Concepts 
Dolphins can label things and report presence or absent 
of such object by pressing on specific paddles [17].  
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Alex was trained on absence of a difference or similarity 
“what same?/what different?”, as well as apes. Thus in- 
dividuals were able to display a zero-like concept—which 
is the expression of an absence of something (e.g. no 
difference or none green block) [46]. Not only Sarah 
mastered the concept of same and different (e.g. apple 
different banana) but also was able to judge the relation- 
ship between relationships, a higher order of conceptu- 
alization (e.g. pairs of apple similar pairs of bananas but 
different an apple and a banana). Sarah learned the con- 
cept of “name of”, “color of”, she also mastered condi- 
tional “if-then” [39]. Lana learned to use “more” and 
“less”. Alex also was able to compare quantity based on 
Arabic numerals or sets of objects or to compare the size 
of two objects. Sea lions were able to mastered compara- 
tive and absolute size comprehension in the Sea lion [43] 
(See the categorization section above for birds exam- 
ples). 
Kanzi, Panbanisha and Panpanzee used precursor of 
morality while pressing the lexigrams “good” and “bad” 
in appropriate contexts. This suggests a symbolic lan- 
guage processing in the different species but heavily in- 
fluenced by the value judgments of their human care- 
givers [74]. 
3.3. Categorization 
The ability to categorize elements of the environment, i.e. 
to classify objects according to proprieties they share, is 
a fundamental aspect of information processing. Con- 
ceptual categorization implies two criteria: a rapid gene- 
ralization over class members of items and a classifica- 
tion of items not necessarily similar perceptually (e.g. 
“food” vs “tool” items [75,76]). Alex, was able to cate- 
gorize items according to their color, shape or matter. He 
was capable of giving the similar and/or different char- 
acteristics of the items presented [77,78]. He was also 
able to identify the number of items according to two 
modalities [79,80]. Alex’s categorization was noteworthy 
because he expressed this classification by verbalizing 
labels. However, Alex received a long training (months 
to years for various items and/or concepts) before being 
able to label and categorize correctly the items presented. 
In a recent study two African grey parrots learning 
French labels spontaneously categorized items with vocal 
imitations [48]. At the time of the experiment, the birds 
knew a few referential labels belonging to two different 
classes (food and objects) and imitated several labels that 
did not refer to particular items. Although we were trying 
to teach them new words, we observed that both subjects 
tried to say some other labels that they knew in order to 
obtain the items presented. The unexpected result was 
that, although never rewarded for this behavior since they 
did not use the labels corresponding to the items shown 
to them, both individual spontaneously emitted more 
“food labels” in front of food items and the male pro- 
duced more “object labels” in front of object items [47]. 
Note that labels of a given category (i.e. either food or 
object labels) do not share common acoustic or visual 
features. Thus, the parrots spontaneously attributed a 
class to their vocalizations according to the edibility of 
the items presented (food or object items). This ability is 
similar to that described in macaques able to distinguish 
food vs non-food items [81]. Such an untrained categori- 
zation is rarely described in animals, but it could be re- 
lated to a mechanism commonly observed in human 
children learning to talk. During the acquisition of the 
meaning of words, children generally adopt two different 
strategies: over-extension and under-extension [82]. The 
latter consists of using different labels for the same item. 
The over-extension strategy consists of attributing one 
label to different items. In children, over-extension usu- 
ally is a process associated with perceptual categorization. 
Overextension gradually disappears when children add 
features to a word such as its functional role [83]. In the 
case of parrots, it seems that they used something like the 
over-extension strategy, by using a few food labels to ask 
for all food items and a few object labels for all object 
items. This type of error in the mechanism of information 
treatment was also observed in language-trained apes 
[38,63]. Pepperberg, without having formerly tested cate- 
gorization with her parrots, reports that when Alex erred 
on, for example, a color label for objects, he most often 
provided another color label [46,77]. 
3.4. Numerical Competencies and Optical 
Illusion 
Furthermore, Alex spontaneously established equiva- 
lency relations between Arabic numerals and the corres- 
ponding sets of items [84]. Alex learned to quantify sets 
of objects with vocal labels [79], choose the set corres 
ponding to the vocal number label [80], utter the corres 
ponding number label in response to the presentation of 
the number symbol and to select the number correspond- 
ing to the vocal number label [85]. Griffin is currently 
tested on visual perception. He already knows some col- 
ors, shapes and numbers. Irene Pepperberg is currently 
addressing the following question: Are you still seeing a 
square even when one of its corners is overlapped by a 
masking object? Yes, it seems that the bird perceive the 
object as complete structure. Maybe grey parrots are able 
to represent mentally the “normal” image of a square. 
Alex had been tested on the Müller-Lyer illusion [86] 
and the results suggest that like humans, birds are sensi- 
tive to optical illusion. 
A bottlenose dolphin discriminates visual stimuli dif- 
fering in numerosity [87]. Apes have been tested on their 
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numerical competencies and their ability to compare 
quantities using items or symbolic representations (object 
or lexigrams). Symbolic representations help chimpan- 
zees to succeed in a reversed reinforcement contingency 
task. They maximize reward choosing the smaller Arabic 
number (and thus receiving the larger quantity of reward) 
but failed to do so when facing the food item [88]. 
3.5. Transmission of the Communicative System 
among Conspecific 
Kanzi learned through observation (of the adult) how to 
use lexigram. Loulis (Washoe was his foster mother) was 
not cross-fostered and learn through interaction with the 
other chimpanzee to sign. Loulis mastered sign language 
through watching, babbling and then doing the sign pro- 
perly [89]. The researchers also observed maternal hand- 
guidance as Washoe molded Loulis’s hand into the sign 
for “food”, or place “drink” on his lips. Several times 
Washoe sign the name of object in front of Loulis and 
before using them such as “brush”, “hat”, etc. Washoe 
also learn new sign from her conspecific such as “blan- 
ket” for instance [38]. 
The same for birds who learn from each other new 
vocalization and thus new words and then associate the 
label with the correct object (or characteristic). Irene 
Pepperberg reports also that Alex vocalized several times 
“say better” or even giving the (right) answer when an- 
other birds was questioned [46]. 
Using lexigrams, words or plastic object is also a good 
way to assess the memory of an individual across the 
time. Thus Lana, Koko, Kanzi et al. remember the name 
of object they did not see for several months [37,90]. 
3.6. Expression of Feelings, Expectations, 
Pleasure or Frustrations 
Irene Pepperberg, taught to employ the vocalization 
“want” before an object label so as to discriminate func- 
tional “labeling” from “requesting” [91]. Thus When 
Alex was asking “What toy?” even if he was not moti- 
vated to play with it he could have ask for a nut after 
having gave the right answer. Indeed, Shango (African 
grey parrot) who was at the beginning of French word 
acquisition, stopped rapidly to say “semoule” (“corn- 
meal”) because he did not like the taste of the corre- 
sponding food [48]. Alex was requesting for a reward 
(want nut) but also to stop the session (“wanna go back/ 
wanna go chair”), or vocalized when he disagree saying 
“No” [46]. Cabanac, who trained Aristote (African grey 
parrot) with the Model/Rival technique, observed that his 
bird was able to combine labels that express preference 
and pleasure. Indeed, the bird was taught with different 
labels and when the experimenter was interacting with 
the birds he pronounced specifics words such as “bon X” 
(“good X”) when given the object X or doing some ac- 
tions (such as preening) the birds just ask for. Latter on 
the author observed that while he was giving a grape to 
Aristote, the bird spontaneously pronounce “raisin bon” 
(“good grappe”), a label combination he never heard be- 
fore [49]. 
In the same way, apes using lexigram or sign language 
requested for food, toy, tickles, etc using the appropriate 
signal and also request for “more” or “less” of it. Washoe 
sign “More” to get more tickling after that the Gardners 
introduced “More” into a game of pulling [38]. 
3.7. Animal Used Artificial Communicative 
System as a Tool 
Four African grey parrots have been tested on their abi- 
lity to obtain an item suspended from a string such that 
multiple, repeated, coordinated beak-foot actions were 
required for success. Only the birds with little training in 
referential English requests (e.g. “want X”) succeeded. 
The two others (Alex & Griffin) failed to obtain the re- 
ward as they did not try and engaged in repeated re- 
questing “want nut” [92]. Even if their intentions were 
not to manipulate humans’ behavior at least the birds 
understand the usefulness of the vocalization and its use 
within a heterospecific communicative system. 
The African grey parrots tested in the French labora- 
tory developed specific asking calls for food [93] but 
they never used it during the test sessions and on the con- 
trary labeled differently the items according to their cate- 
gory (food vs toy) [48]. 
Apes signed, pressed lexigram or combined object in 
order to request for food or toy or whatever. In captivity, 
Chimpanzees have been observed to beg extending an 
open hand and vocalizing. Loulis for instance produced 
the sign “Gimme” to request for a preferred food [89]. 
4. Conclusions 
Several individuals of very few species have been in- 
volved in language-trained studies. Mostly primates but 
also other mammals such as dolphins, sea lion or dogs 
and one bird species, the grey parrot. The different ex- 
periments have more or less successful according to the 
technique used (e.g. joystick vs ASL) but also to the in- 
dividuals [37]. 
All these studies provide astonishing results for the 
scientific community. Animal species are able to com- 
prehend and produce part of a communicative system 
and able to understand new utterance. The gap between 
human and non-human species is smaller than expected. 
These studies have changed the perception humans had 
from the rest of animal species. Even animals with a 
brain of the size of a walnut (grey parrots) manage to 
learn words and describe the characteristics of objects 
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according several modality and also to elaborate complex 
concept. All the data collected change the way animal 
consciousness was perceived by humans. This have a di- 
rect impact on animal right and the laws for animal wel- 
fare. 
The different individuals tested have shown complex 
and diverse competencies. Thanks to the different artifi- 
cial language systems, the researchers manage to interact 
directly with the animals and thus access to a part of their 
own world. 
All the experiments presented have raised many ques- 
tions and critics among the community; critics about the 
methods used, about the number of animal or the influ- 
ence of human on the animals’ answers and also the way 
to validate or not new acquired “word”. Some studies 
raised also ethic and welfare issues (e.g. activists had 
released dolphins in ocean) sometimes because of the 
housing conditions or the difficulty for the animal to 
adapt a life with conspecific later on (for apes for exam- 
ple). For instance Washoe, sign “black bugs” to design- 
nate conspecifics (seen for the first time) [94]. Working 
in close proximity every day for several years with these 
animals leads to the establishment of strong bonds be- 
tween experimenters and subjects-humans and animals 
[95]. 
The different experiments presented are complex be- 
cause it takes time to teach animals a new code of com- 
munication but also because the results obtained (when 
obtained), come from only one individual (of one spe- 
cies). This type of study is also costly and time consum- 
ing. Most of the species tested are long-living animal 
species, some of them could be very aggressive or at 
least represent a danger for human because of their 
strength. Several people involved in apes studies lost one 
or more fingers. Thus the dogs—as tested in the recent 
study—seemed to be a good compromise between all 
these constrains and the advantages to be able to share a 
communicative system. 
Some individuals had (have) incredible cognitive abili- 
ties. For instance Kanzi is able to communicate using 
lexigram, vocal production and sign language. He also 
demonstrates a great ability in using tool (motor imita- 
tion) [96]. Some individuals show some sense of time. 
For instance Nyota uses “yesterday” and “today” or Tatu 
who had a good sense of time, and knew that Christmas 
followed Thanksgiving [97]. Individuals express also 
empathy, comfort, or deception. They can inform the 
experimenter about something in their environment but 
can also lie to avoid punishment. They express their feel- 
ing such as the joy, embarrassment or the sadness signing 
or pressing key “happy”, “angry”, “smile”, “cry”, “hurt”, 
etc. [97]. 
Scientist would now look to see if this new communi- 
cative system is used between individuals and across 
generations. The scientific community would tend to 
look to more accessible species such as dog which are 
already living in human houses! Thus not only we can 
know (or guess) what an animal think or feel watching its 
behaviors, social interactions and reactions (in decision 
making), we can study their ecology to have a better under- 
standing on their natural communicative system but most 
importantly we can also develop an artificial communi- 
cative system to be share with other animal species in 
order to access the “black box”. Nevertheless the issue of 
human interpretation still exists even with the artificial 
communicative system. 
All these experiments had also brought information 
about the roots and the evolution of human language, 
even if some results are still controversy but more im- 
portantly raised other questions such as semantic aspect 
of the signals sequence. 
Though useful information might lie in the “collected 
data” (animal mind), extracting them into insightful 
knowledge with human-accessible form (clear meaning, 
no interpretation) presents a demanding and sophisticated 
undertaking. Using a human designed language represent 
a window at the “black box”. The different techniques 
developed lead to increase our knowledge on how ani- 
mals perceive the world. Through the different examples 
presented, we have seen that the individuals (whatever 
was the species) organized their knowledge and develop 
strategy in order to solve the problem the experimenter 
were giving them (mostly answering questions). Scientist 
look at how animals learns, used and also their errors in 
order to access the way they are processing information. 
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